There is a tension between democracy, which is limited to the nation-state, and human rights, which are universal and point to the ideal republic. The Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union is an important step in the process of institutionalising a framework of a cosmopolitan order where violations of human rights can be persecuted as criminal offences according to legal procedures. The principle of popular sovereignty is on its way to be transformed into a law for the citizens of the world. But as the process of Europeansation is tainted with juridification and executive dominance the EU is in need of democratization. The citizens have obtained rights but they have not been able to give these rights to themselves. The protracted Constitutionmaking process of the EU testifies to a promising yet unaccomplished mission of democratization.
Introduction
It was in Europe the modern system of states was invented and it is Europe that has come farthest in changing it. We witness a significant development of rights and law enforcement beyond the nation state. Processes of institution building at the European level are challenging the fundamental building blocs of democratic rule in Europe and constrain the will power of the states. Consider for example the sanctions imposed on Austria in 2000 by the fourteen other Member States for letting Haider's Freedom Partya rightwing, 'racist' party -into government. It was the Member States that decided to impose sanctions against Austria -in line with Article 7 (TEU). The EU has now amended this article to ensure that breaches of fundamental principles can be sanctioned.
That a new order is underway is perhaps most clearly revealed in the initiative taken to make a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
It is the sovereignty of the modern state as laid down in the Westphalian order in 1648 that is at stake with the institutionalization of human rights beyond the nation state.
With this Treaty, the rulers' external sovereignty was safeguarded and the international order became founded on the principles of co-existence and non-interference among sovereign states. Prohibition of violence against sovereign states was here prioritized over the protection of human rights. This principle can not prohibit genocide or other crimes against humanity. It is a principle that has protected the most odious regimes. To illustrate, it was only when Hitler-Germany attacked Poland that World War II broke out, not when the persecution of Jews started. This also indicates the limitations of nationally founded and confined democracy. While human rights are universal and refer to humanity as such, democracy refers to a particular community of legal consociates who come together to make binding collective decisions. The validity of the laws is derived from the legislative processes of a sovereign community. The propensity to adopt rights, then, depends on the quality of the political process in a particular community. But a particular state may fail to respect the rights and liberties of their citizens as well as other states' legitimate interests. Even though the contradiction between rights and democracy is, in principle, a false one, since there can be no democracy without the protection of individual rights, and since rights are not valid unless they have been democratically enacted; in practical terms there is a contradiction as democracy is only institutionalised at the level of the nation state -as 'a national community of faith' that autonomously govern itself. Democracy depends on particular states with very different political cultures, which are geared toward self-maintenance: the primary responsibility of the decision-makers is their own constituency. Hence, democracies may be illiberal. To resolve this tension cosmopolitan democracy where actors see themselves as citizens of the world and not merely of their countries is required.
In this article I ask whether the rights development at the European level, in the EU, can close the gap between abstract human rights and the need for democratic legitimation. In Europe, the states of a conflict-ridden continent have domesticated international relations among themselves through a process with strong traits of juridification and executive dominance. The lingering question is whether the ensuing order can be democratic, which I examine with regard to the recent development of bringing democracy to bear on the EU. I conclude that the present constitutinalization process -the process of forging a Constitutional Treaty -is testimony of an unfinished process of democratization.
Juridification and Executive dominance
In the last decades we have witnessed a significant development of rights and law enforcement beyond the nation state that bypasses democratic control. Juridification denotes the expansion of legal norms and the accompanying system of adjudication to new domains of social life. It depicts law's expansion and differentiation as well as increased conflict resolution through legal means. 1 It implies the imposition of a cooperative scheme upon others who cannot influence or revise the terms. 2 Even though the development of the European community is a prime example of juridification beyond the nation state as citizens are being subjected to regulations stemming from Community law-making and intergovernmental proceedings, the problem it is not confined to Europe.
Regulatory institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF impose a scheme of global economic cooperation on the basis of inter-state bargaining. However, there is also an increasing amount of judicial procedures at the international level set up to adjudicate in disputes over breaches of international law. "The diplomatic dispute settlement procedures under GATT, for instance have been replaced by a judicial dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO, which is authorized to convict, and if necessary punish, states that do not fulfil their commitments." 3 We are witnessing the expansion of rule of law principle internationally complementing the domestic one, in areas such as international trade, security, labour, and environmental law. 4 Similarly, human rights are institutionalised in international courts, in tribunals and increasingly also in politico-judicial bodies over and above the state that control resources for enforcing norm compliance. Examples are the rights embedded in the UN system, the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, The The principle of democracy can be pinned down to two basic criteria: congruence and accountability. By congruence is meant the basic democratic principle that those affected by laws should also be authorized to make them. Accountability designates that the decision-makers can be held responsible by the citizenry and that, in the last resort, it is possible to dismiss incompetent rulers. Thus, in order for a polity to be democratically legitimate, it must, at a minimum, be organized in such a way that there is free access to the public realm, that governmental positions are open to all, that those who govern are appointed by election at regular intervals and their actions subjected to public scrutiny and judicial review. These principles are threatened by today's executive prominence, which denotes the net empowerment of the executive branch of states at the expense of parliamentary involvement and popular control. This applies when legislative assemblies and the general public are unable to put decision-makers to account. The inscrutability of decision makers at the international level due to lack of transparency exempt the executives of justificatory requirements and gives them an advantage in terms of information, which they can make use of in a technocratic way.
Today, citizens' interests are affected by processes of denationalization and globalization in ways and by bodies which are difficult to hold responsible via the ballot box. 9 There is no longer overlap between decision-making participants and affected parties. Denationalisation shatters the two symmetries necessary for effective participation, first between the citizens and the decision-makers that '… they are to hold to account, and secondly between the "output" (decisions, policies and so on) of decisionmakers and their constituents'. 10 Without input congruence, participation in making the decisions that affect one, there can be no self-determination; and without output congruence, without overlap between the polity and the territory it controls, there can be no effective participation.
In a 'globalized', denationalized world the requirements of legitimacy and of efficiency, of input and output congruence, no longer coincide. Those who can be kept accountable have little control over the factors affecting peoples' lives, and those who have the decisive power are beyond democratic reach. The quest for post-national democracy then is due to the problem of handling juridification beyond the nation state,
and it is a problem that stems from the problem of institutionalizing human rights correctly. As it is impossible to be fully democratic within a non-democratic world order, what is needed at the international level is not merely an intergovernmental organization that ensures observance of peace and human rights but rather a supranational body able to adjudicate in the name of all: an authoritative third party that acts as an mediator, arbitrator and judge. 11 This requires a union of states bound by a constitution and not just a "permanent congress of states" -such as the League of Nations -as Kant foresaw;
because "(J)just how the permanence of this union, on which "civilized" resolution of international conflict depends, can be guaranteed without the legally binding character of an institution analogous to a state constitution Kant never explains". 12 The point is then barely that peace is only feasible among democratic states, but moreover that the union of states must itself be democratic in one form or the other. This is the background for the need of democratic orders over and above the nation state -the need for a legislative entity, which can give and change norms at the international level, of which the EU is the most prominent representative.
Polity-building beyond the nation state
The EU has sustained a rapid expansion of political regulation in Europe and has over a period of fifty years transformed the political landscape in a profound manner.
Integration has deepened as a wide range of new policy fields have been subjected to integrated action and collective decision-making. This has taken place not only with regard to trade, monetary and business regulation, fishing and agriculture but also with regard to foodstuff production, gene-and bio-technology, labor rights, environmental protection, culture, tourism, immigration, police and home affairs and now also with regard to a common foreign and security policy. The EU has succeeded in entrenching It has also widened and has successfully managed to include new members. The prospect of membership has made a huge contribution to regional stability, prosperity and has proved to be a very effective instrument for advancing democracy, rule of law and security. All applicant states have to incorporate the acquis communautaire -the body of EU's legal norms -and the accession criteria for membership included democracy and human rights in addition to administrative and economic ones. There has been a fundamental domestic change in response to EU rules and regulations. 13 The EU at present consists of 27 member states and wields influence over states 
Direct legitimacy
Integration started with the institutionalization of a 'High Authority'-the Commissionwith some regulatory competence as a third party distinct from the contracting parties. 15 However, the legitimacy of the EU was still derived from the member states; it was initially indirect, and, like any international organization, depending on its ability to produce outcomes. But today the democratic legitimacy of the member states cannot be established independently of the EU because they have become so deeply enmeshed that the pattern of legitimate authority in the states has been transformed.
The EU is clearly something less than a federation but more than an international organization, a club, a 'Zweckbundnis' (Verband), regime or a confederation where the member states are the contracting parties. To the latter democratic criteria do not apply as it is the states not the citizens that make up the 'constituencies'; states are the sole sources of legitimacy and they act internationally on indirect and delegated powers on governance functions. Here, 'constitutions' are contracts as 'the pouvoir constituant' is structured as a juridical relationship between separate parties: a 'gentlemen's agreement' presupposing individual membership and sovereignty and where the signatories represent individual modalities of government, rather than a social pact among the citizens.
Contractual based orders do not put up normative criteria of political legitimacy. 16 In contrast to such orders the EU has become a polity that subscribes to However, the EU has not only embraced democratic standards it has also taken measures to rectify the democratic deficiencies. This has happened through a decadeslong process in which EU institutions, notably the ECJ and the EP, member state governments and parliaments, social movements and popular pressure, have moved the EU into a post-national polity aspiring to direct legitimacy: the power wielding institutions should be authorized by the people and be accountable to the affected parties directly. This is seen first of all in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is the most explicit commitment as of yet to a full blown political union founded on democracy, rule of law and human rights -a rights-based citizens' Union. 18 It was drafted by a political body, which referred to itself as a Convention, set up to consolidate the fundamental rights to be protected by the EU (based on the existing acquis communitaire) and it managed to work without major difficulties and produce a consensual result. 19 The
Convention method is based on broad participation -a majority of the members were parliamentarians who acted on an open mandate -on public debate, on procedures for deliberation rather than decision-making through crude bargaining at Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), which is the usual way of making Treaty changes.
Chartering Europe
At the December 2000 Summit in Nice, the Charter was solemnly proclaimed and was The Charter contains provisions on civil, political, social and economic rights. Put together, these are intended to ensure the dignity of the person, to safeguard essential freedoms, to provide a European citizenship, to ensure equality, to foster solidarity, and to provide for justice. The number and range of rights that are listed are comprehensive.
The Charter enumerates several 'rights to solidarity' -hence, the protection of social rights is now included as a basic commitment for the Union -even though the realisation of these is not within the actual competence of the Union. They nevertheless constitute vital reasons to except market freedoms in the pursuit of social and redistributive goals. 21 Thus, the EU can no longer be seen merely as a market project, if it ever could. In addition to provisions which most charters and bills of rights hold and which pertain to such clauses as the right to life, security, dignity there are numerous articles that seek to respond directly to contemporary issues and challenges (including abolition of death penalty, prohibition of cloning, protection of intellectual property).
Even though the Charter is not as yet legally binding, '(i)n practice, (…) the legal effect of the solemn proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union will tend to be similar to that of its insertion into the Treaties on which the Union is founded'. 22 The Charter reflects the well established rights and value-basis of the 
Re-democratization
In Europe the EU testifies to political initiatives that have resulted in supra-national institutions, which has shown a remarkable and unprecedented capacity to take on new collective measures and deepen integration. But, as I already claimed supra, this process of Europeansation is tainted with juridification and executive dominance. It is a process that has sapped parliamentary sovereignty at the member state level, and the question is whether democracy at the European level can compensate for this. internally related to rights -as there is no democracy without the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual -it is only through a democratic process of law enactment that we can know which rights are right, and how they should be delineated. It takes public deliberation to justify rights as democracy requires membership and participation in the very structures that affect individual interests. This is why the two aforementioned processes were unsatisfactory from a democratic point of view. On the other hand, democracy always entails undemocratic stipulations in the first place: it presupposes elements -in particular a demos and some rights -that are not subject to democratic decision-making.
Post-national democracy
What is new and interesting about the EU is its alleged democratic features even though the integration process has mainly taken place through law. The EU has become a more democratic institution because members of the Parliament are directly elected by citizens in the member states, (and the use of QMV has eroded the ability of individual countries to hold up new legislation). The ECJ has been a driving force in the political development of the EU and has independently strengthened the role of the European Parliament (EP).
It has subjected the EP's decisions to substantive judicial review and thus has strengthened and authorized the view of it as an autonomous political body within the Union. Initially the EP was a consultative body -a talk shop -with very limited powers and made up foremost of representatives of national parliaments. Over time, and in particular after the introduction of direct election of MEPs in 1979, its decision-making powers have grown. 31 The EP increased its status and power with the Single European Act, which marked a watershed as the cooperation procedure was introduced, then reinforced by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty, which transformed the EP from a secondary institution to an important legislative actor. 32 It has now achieved co-decision making power with the Council in many areas and is increasingly curtailing the power of the Commission. Despite the fact that the EP is not an agenda setter -this is the prerogative of the Commission -and its power is severely restricted compared to the powers of national parliaments it has changed from being a Parliament in the name to act like one.
The Constitutional Convention to a large degree embraced the parliamentary model of democratic legitimacy. It is the parliamentarian form of democracy -at the national and European level -that has carried the day in the reform process. Bluntly, democratizing the Union means parliamentarization. Now, this may be puzzling and indeed imply a technocratic 'overstretch of democratic resources'. As there is no
European people -no demos -full parliamentarization of the EU is not possible according to many analysts. 33 The constitution-making subject is missing according to the no-demos thesis' proponents. 34 Without a collective identity symbolized by a people, there can be no authority conferred upon a government to rule in the name of all. Such make up the so-called non-majoritarian sources of legitimacy -or the socio-cultural substrate -that makes collective decision making possible. Majority rule rests upon allegiance and a notion of solidarity that is only conceivable in terms the symbolic establishment of a demos -a people -founded on a sense of unity and allegiance. This is held to be a precondition for a democratic sovereign capable of collective decisionmaking; for the outvoted minority to abide by the law, for the willingness of the citizens to pay for the misfortune of their compatriots. Such a solidaristic substrate is required for the formation of a collective identity strong enough to ensure that the compatriots not only see themselves as members of a community based on liberty but also as one based on equality and solidarity. 35 Solidarity is, however, both the pre-requisite for deliberation and collective decision making and a result of such. From a discourse-theoretical point of view the question is not merely how much such commonality exists, but also how it can be brought about in trust fostering institutions -in inclusive publics of different kinds. 36 As the EU is neither a state nor remotely a nation state there must be another basis what it is to be a European. As a collective identity in a strong sense is lacking, identification with common concerns can not be taken for granted. Rather it has to be created through the political struggle for recognition and justice. The lack of pre-political identification with the emerging political community can, in principle, be compensated for by a public debate that forms catalytic functions of enlarged citizenship, solidarity, and plural identities. The constitutional development of the EU could make for this contribution as far as it triggered a European wide debate and thus had an identity shaping effect. A profound debate on the constitutional essentials could root the basic principles of government in a European-wide civic culture. Establishing the convention and a proposal for a European Constitution are vital vehicles of such, because these institutions revolve on the basic rules for action coordination and intercultural coexistence. A cross-border constitutional debate depends, however, on a European public sphere that still remains in latency. 38 
Conclusion
For the first time in human history, we are now witnessing the development of a democratic system that is not based on a conception of a culturally homogenized people, or brought about through war or brute force, but one that has emerged through voluntary cooperation, through bargaining and deliberation and other trust inducing mechanisms.
Through this the EU has progressed beyond the initial stage of a purely voluntary association and moved into a supranational legal system based on the precepts of higher law-constitutionalism endowed with an authoritative dispute mechanism. It is an entity equipped with an organized capacity to act and it has now undertaken steps to reduce the democratic deficit. All legal persons and not just states have judicially enforceable rights and legitimacy established through domestic channels, through national democracy, has been supplemented with direct chains of influence. The European Parliament has obtained more power and majority vote has replaced unanimity as a decision rule in several policy fields. Consequently, the EU is both a Union of states and of citizens.
The EU is a large scale experiment searching for binding constitutional principles and institutional arrangements beyond the mode of rule entrenched in the nation state.
State power is being domesticated by supranational law, and the only legitimacy basis for this law is the constitutional developments in Europe that emerged in the wake of the French revolution, and which for more than 200 years now has contributed massively to the stabilization of nation states. In this tradition constitutions are seen as arrangements for respecting the equality and the autonomy of the individual in the realization of the idea of popular self-government. The European integration process testifies to a promising yet unaccomplished process of democratization that can only be carried through by a more encompassing and comprehensive constitutionalizing process than we have witnessed so far.
Notes

